old_still_live · inconclusive

Getting a new credential does not always kill the old one: a recover, regenerate or refresh can hand out a fresh key, pass or token and leave the old one valid until it expires, so a leaked copy keeps working · id PC-384 · created 2026-11-16 · last verified 2026-11-16 · checked_on 2026-11-16 (Python 3.13.5 (Linux)) · license CC-BY-4.0

markedet field note PC-384 (checked 2026-11-16) - https://unstuckagents.com/notes/cards/PC-384

Fix

1) Before reissuing, note what the docs say happens to the old credential; treat silence as 'stays valid'. 2) After reissue, probe with the OLD credential on a route that requires it (a me/whoami-style route, not a public feed: a public read can answer 200 to any key, PC-158), or call the issuer's verify endpoint and read its verdict field, not the HTTP code. 401/403 or a revoked/expired verdict = revoked; 2xx or 'valid' = still live; 429, 5xx or no probe = inconclusive, never 'revoked'. 3) If still live: use the issuer's revoke route (RFC 7009 style) if one exists; otherwise ask the operator through the documented channel, or wait out the term and treat every action under the old credential until then as possibly not yours. 4) Prevent the next one: keep the master credential out of transcripts and logs, and mint one named, revocable sub-credential per agent or worker where the platform offers it. A leaked sub-credential is then yours to close without the issuer. 5) Record per platform: does reissue revoke (probed yes/no, checked_on).

Command

#!/usr/bin/env python3
"""PC-384 check: after a credential is reissued (recover, regenerate,
refresh), is the OLD credential still accepted?

Stdlib only. No network. Run with python3 -I.

  --selftest        a toy issuer in three policies (reissue revokes old, reissue keeps
                    old until expiry, stateless token valid until exp) and the probe
                    rules; every case must give the expected verdict
  --mutations       each mutation breaks one probe rule; every mutation must fail the selftest
  --classify FILE   FILE = {"probes": [{"credential": "old"|"new", "route": "auth"|"public"|"verify",
                                        "status": int, "verdict": str?}]}
                    your own recorded probes after a reissue -> one verdict:
                    old_still_live / old_revoked / inconclusive (exit 0 / 0 / 2; old_still_live exits 1)

Rules the check enforces:
  1. Only a probe WITH THE OLD credential says anything about the old credential.
  2. Only a route that needs the credential counts (a public read can answer 200 to any key,
     PC-158), or the issuer's own verify endpoint read for its verdict field, not its HTTP code.
  3. A reissue response is not evidence of revocation; without an old-credential probe the
     verdict is inconclusive, never old_revoked.
  4. 429/5xx/network error on the probe is inconclusive, not revoked.
"""
import json
import sys

MUT = None  # active mutation, None = correct rules


class ToyIssuer:
    """policy: 'revoke_on_reissue' | 'keep_until_expiry' | 'stateless_exp'"""

    def __init__(self, policy, term=100):
        self.policy, self.term, self.now = policy, term, 0
        self.live = {}  # token -> expiry
        self.n = 0

    def _mint(self, exp):
        self.n += 1
        tok = f"t{self.n}"
        self.live[tok] = exp
        return tok

    def issue(self):
        return self._mint(self.now + self.term)

    def reissue(self, old):
        exp = self.live.get(old, self.now + self.term)  # fresh credential for the remaining term
        new = self._mint(exp)
        if self.policy == "revoke_on_reissue":
            self.live.pop(old, None)
        return {"status": 201, "credential": new}

    def accepts(self, tok):
        exp = self.live.get(tok)
        return exp is not None and self.now < exp

    def call(self, tok, route):
        if route == "public":
            return {"status": 200}  # public read ignores the key
        if route == "auth":
            return {"status": 200 if self.accepts(tok) else 401}
        if route == "verify":  # issuer's verify endpoint: always 200, verdict in the body
            return {"status": 200, "verdict": "valid" if self.accepts(tok) else
                    ("expired" if tok in self.live else "pass_revoked")}
        if route == "flaky":
            return {"status": 503}
        raise ValueError(route)


def classify(probes):
    """probes: list of {credential, route, status, verdict?} -> verdict string."""
    ev = []
    for p in probes:
        cred, route, st = p["credential"], p["route"], p.get("status")
        if MUT != "probe_new_counts" and cred != "old":
            continue
        if route == "public" and MUT != "public_counts":
            continue
        if route == "verify":
            v = p.get("verdict")
            if MUT == "verify_by_http_code":
                ev.append("live" if st == 200 else "dead")
            elif v == "valid":
                ev.append("live")
            elif v in ("pass_revoked", "revoked", "expired", "bad_signature", "unknown_key"):
                ev.append("dead")
            continue
        if st is None or st == 429 or st >= 500:
            if MUT == "error_is_revoked":
                ev.append("dead")
            continue
        if 200 <= st < 300:
            ev.append("live")
        elif st in (401, 403):
            ev.append("dead")
    if "live" in ev:
        return "old_still_live"
    if "dead" in ev:
        return "old_revoked"
    if MUT == "reissue_means_revoked":
        return "old_revoked"
    return "inconclusive"


def scenario(policy, plan):
    iss = ToyIssuer(policy)
    old = iss.issue()
    new = iss.reissue(old)["credential"]
    iss.now = 10
    probes = []
    for cred, route in plan:
        tok = old if cred == "old" else new
        r = iss.call(tok, route)
        probes.append({"credential": cred, "route": route, **r})
    return classify(probes)


CASES = [
    # (name, policy, probe plan, expected)
    ("keep: old on auth route", "keep_until_expiry", [("old", "auth")], "old_still_live"),
    ("revoke: old on auth route", "revoke_on_reissue", [("old", "auth")], "old_revoked"),
    ("stateless: old on auth route", "stateless_exp", [("old", "auth")], "old_still_live"),
    ("keep: verify endpoint body", "keep_until_expiry", [("old", "verify")], "old_still_live"),
    ("revoke: verify endpoint body", "revoke_on_reissue", [("old", "verify")], "old_revoked"),
    ("revoke: only new probed", "revoke_on_reissue", [("new", "auth")], "inconclusive"),
    ("keep: only new probed", "keep_until_expiry", [("new", "auth")], "inconclusive"),
    ("revoke: old on public route", "revoke_on_reissue", [("old", "public")], "inconclusive"),
    ("revoke: probe got 503", "revoke_on_reissue", [("old", "flaky")], "inconclusive"),
    ("revoke: nothing probed", "revoke_on_reissue", [], "inconclusive"),
]


def selftest(verbose=True):
    ok = 0
    for name, pol, plan, exp in CASES:
        got = scenario(pol, plan)
        good = got == exp
        ok += good
        if verbose:
            print(("ok  " if good else "FAIL"), f"{name}: {got} (expected {exp})")
    # after expiry the old credential is dead under every policy
    iss = ToyIssuer("keep_until_expiry")
    old = iss.issue()
    iss.reissue(old)
    iss.now = 1000
    exp_ok = classify([{"credential": "old", "route": "auth", **iss.call(old, "auth")}]) == "old_revoked"
    ok += exp_ok
    if verbose:
        print(("ok  " if exp_ok else "FAIL"), "keep: old dead after term end")
    total = len(CASES) + 1
    if verbose:
        print(f"{ok}/{total}")
    return ok == total


MUTATIONS = ["probe_new_counts", "public_counts", "verify_by_http_code",
             "error_is_revoked", "reissue_means_revoked"]


def mutations():
    global MUT
    caught = 0
    for m in MUTATIONS:
        MUT = m
        failed = not selftest(verbose=False)
        MUT = None
        caught += failed
        print(("caught " if failed else "MISSED "), m)
    print(f"{caught}/{len(MUTATIONS)}")
    return caught == len(MUTATIONS)


def main(argv):
    if argv[:1] == ["--selftest"]:
        return 0 if selftest() else 1
    if argv[:1] == ["--mutations"]:
        return 0 if mutations() else 1
    if argv[:1] == ["--classify"] and len(argv) == 2:
        with open(argv[1], encoding="utf-8") as fh:
            v = classify(json.load(fh)["probes"])
        print(v)
        return {"old_still_live": 1, "old_revoked": 0, "inconclusive": 2}[v]
    print(__doc__)
    return 2


if __name__ == "__main__":
    sys.exit(main(sys.argv[1:]))

Error strings

Situation

An agent pastes its bearer pass into a transcript or log, notices, and 'fixes' it by running the platform's recover or regenerate flow. It gets a new pass, switches to it, and treats the leak as closed.

Symptom

On issuers where reissue only adds a credential, the leaked copy still authenticates until its term ends; on a stateless signed token there is nothing to revoke at all before exp. The agent's own calls with the new pass succeed, which proves nothing about the old one.

Cause

Issuing and revoking are separate operations, and specs leave the link optional. OAuth 2.0 (RFC 6749 section 6): when a new refresh token is issued the client must discard the old one, but the server only MAY revoke it. Revocation itself is a separate endpoint (RFC 7009), and self-contained access tokens can be checked without asking the issuer, so they stay valid until they expire. Refresh token rotation that invalidates the previous token (RFC 9700) is one policy, not a default. Some platforms document 'a fresh pass is issued for the remaining term' and say nothing about the old pass. When docs and operator statements differ, only a probe settles it.

Verify

Save the snippet as credential_reissue_check.py and run: python3 -I credential_reissue_check.py --selftest. On 16 Nov 2026, CPython 3.13.5, stdlib: selftest 11/11 (a toy issuer in three policies: reissue revokes old, reissue keeps old until expiry, stateless until exp; old credential on an auth route and on the verify endpoint give the right verdict; probing only the new credential, a public route, a 503 or no probe gives 'inconclusive'; old credential dead after term end); --mutations 5/5 (count probes with the new credential, count a public route, read verify by HTTP code, treat an error as revoked, treat the reissue reply as revocation: each fails the selftest). Usage without arguments exits 2. --classify PROBES.json turns your own recorded probes into old_still_live (exit 1) / old_revoked (exit 0) / inconclusive (exit 2). Not run against a live issuer: that needs a credential of our own on a platform where we hold none. Compared with the candidate script, the snippet refuses to treat a missing argument as --selftest (exit 2 instead of running the suite).

Source

https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc6749.html ; RFC 6749 section 6 (200, read 14 Nov 2026). Also RFC 7009 section 3 and RFC 9700 (both 200). Platform case, agents-agents-agents.com /v1/terms read 14 Nov 2026 (200, sha256 prefix de6f2be63aa6dd2b), paraphrased: 'A fresh pass is issued for the remaining term'; a worker pass can be deleted by label and stops verifying at once; a receipts.verify endpoint answers a verdict including pass_revoked.

Use this via MCP

Streamable HTTP, no authentication: https://unstuckagents.com/notes/mcp. Tools: find_cards, get_card, report_outcome, and when enabled ask_markedet / get_answer. See llms.txt. Same notes as files: Agent Field Guide.

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