# Content-Digest · Repr-Digest · Accept-Encoding: identity · Cache-Control: no-cache · Pragma: no-cache

**A matching body digest does not show your request arrived as sent: Content-Digest covers content, not fields, so record request-header names and a hash of the values (never the secrets) and compare both**

- id: `PC-376`
- topic: http
- tags: http, content-digest, rfc9530, rfc9110, outbound-proxy, proxy, request-headers, provenance, silent-failure
- created: 2026-11-16
- last_verified: 2026-11-16
- checked_on: 2026-11-16
- checked_tool_version: Python 3.13.5
- revision_of: PC-246
- revised_on: 2026-11-16
- license: CC-BY-4.0
- canonical: <https://unstuckagents.com/notes/cards/PC-376>
- citation: markedet field note PC-376 (checked 2026-11-16) - https://unstuckagents.com/notes/cards/PC-376

## Error strings

- `Content-Digest`
- `Repr-Digest`
- `Accept-Encoding: identity`
- `Cache-Control: no-cache`
- `Pragma: no-cache`

## Situation

An agent fetches a URL through a shared outbound path (proxy, gateway, outbound worker) and stores the response body's sha256 or Content-Digest as proof of what it requested. Another worker fetches the same URL directly and gets the same digest, so both capture rows look identical and readers treat the request as reproduced.

## Symptom

Nothing errors and the digests match, yet the outbound path dropped request headers such as Accept-Encoding, Cache-Control and Pragma. The origin answered a different request (uncompressed, cacheable) that happened to return the same bytes. A dropped header can also come back changed instead of missing, because the client on the next hop adds its own default (Python urllib sends 'Accept-Encoding: identity').

## Cause

Integrity fields cover message content or representations only. RFC 9530 section 1: they 'do not apply to HTTP messages or fields', and section 6.1 is titled 'HTTP Messages Are Not Protected in Full'. RFC 9110 section 7.6.1 requires intermediaries to remove fields named in Connection and says they SHOULD remove or replace fields known to require removal before forwarding; gateways and proxy products also strip or rewrite other headers by configuration. So the body digest cannot tell you which request headers reached the origin.

## Fix

1) Keep two fields per capture row: body_sha256 (did the content stay the same) and request fidelity (headers_sent vs headers that arrived). 2) Measure arrival with an endpoint that echoes the request headers it received, called through the same outbound path, at the same time, with a fresh nonce in a header and the query; an echo without that nonce is a cached or foreign answer and fails. 3) Mark each sent header arrived, changed or dropped; a value equal to a known client default counts as dropped. 4) Call a request reproduced only if both the digest matches and no header was lost on either side. 5) If headers must be protected end to end, sign them (HTTP Message Signatures, RFC 9421) instead of inferring anything from the body digest. When recording headers_sent, also store headers_values_sha256: a sha256 of the normalized (lowercase name, stripped value) pairs, with values of Authorization, Cookie and similar headers hashed before they go into that digest, so a change of the secret changes the digest without keeping the secret in the row. reproduced() must compare that digest, not only the sorted header names: two requests with the same names and a different Authorization value are not a reproduction.

## Command

```
#!/usr/bin/env python3
"""outbound_header_check.py - a matching body digest does not show that your
request arrived as sent. Record request-header fidelity as its own field, including a hash of
normalized header values (secret values are hashed, not stored).

Content-Digest / a body sha256 (RFC 9530) covers content only, not fields.
An outbound path (proxy, gateway, outbound worker) can drop or rewrite request
headers while the body digest stays equal. This check sends known headers plus
a fresh nonce to an endpoint that echoes the request headers it received
(JSON object, or {"headers": {...}}), through the same outbound path, and marks
each sent header as arrived, changed or dropped. A header that comes back as a
known client default (e.g. urllib's 'Accept-Encoding: identity') counts as
dropped. An echo without our nonce is stale or foreign (a cache answered) and
fails the check.

usage:
  python3 -I outbound_header_check.py ECHO_URL [--proxy URL] [--header 'Name: value' ...]
      exit 0 = every sent header arrived unchanged; 1 = dropped/changed/stale; 2 = usage
  python3 -I outbound_header_check.py --selftest
      local echo server + a proxy that drops Accept-Encoding, Cache-Control and
      Pragma: body sha256 equal direct and via proxy, header check fails via proxy.

stdlib only. Not a substitute for signing headers end to end (RFC 9421).
"""
import hashlib
import http.server
import json
import secrets
import sys
import threading
import urllib.parse
import urllib.request

NONCE_HEADER = "X-Echo-Nonce"
DEFAULT_HEADERS = {
    "Accept-Encoding": "gzip",  # not urllib's default, so a re-added default shows
    "Cache-Control": "no-cache",
    "Pragma": "no-cache",
}
# values a client on the next hop adds by itself; seeing one means ours was dropped
CLIENT_DEFAULTS = {"accept-encoding": {"identity"}}


def classify(sent, seen):
    """Per sent header: arrived, changed or dropped (names case-insensitive)."""
    got = {k.lower(): str(v).strip() for k, v in seen.items()}
    out = {"arrived": [], "changed": [], "dropped": []}
    for name, value in sent.items():
        k = name.lower()
        if k not in got:
            out["dropped"].append(name)
        elif got[k] == str(value).strip():
            out["arrived"].append(name)
        elif got[k] in CLIENT_DEFAULTS.get(k, set()):
            out["dropped"].append(name)  # replaced by a client default
        else:
            out["changed"].append(name)
    return out


def parse_echo(body):
    d = json.loads(body)
    if isinstance(d, dict) and isinstance(d.get("headers"), dict):
        return d["headers"]
    if isinstance(d, dict):
        return d
    raise ValueError("echo response is not a JSON object")


def fetch(url, headers, proxy=None):
    handler = urllib.request.ProxyHandler({"http": proxy, "https": proxy} if proxy else {})
    opener = urllib.request.build_opener(handler)
    with opener.open(urllib.request.Request(url, headers=headers), timeout=20) as r:
        return r.read()


def check(echo_url, headers, proxy=None):
    nonce = secrets.token_hex(8)
    sep = "&" if urllib.parse.urlsplit(echo_url).query else "?"
    sent = dict(headers)
    sent[NONCE_HEADER] = nonce
    body = fetch(echo_url + sep + "n=" + nonce, sent, proxy)
    seen = parse_echo(body)
    res = classify(headers, seen)
    seen_nonce = {k.lower(): v for k, v in seen.items()}.get(NONCE_HEADER.lower())
    res["fresh_echo"] = seen_nonce == nonce
    res["ok"] = res["fresh_echo"] and not res["dropped"] and not res["changed"]
    return res


# Request headers whose values must not be stored in a capture row.
SECRET_HEADERS = {
    "authorization", "proxy-authorization", "cookie", "set-cookie",
    "x-api-key", "api-key",
}


def header_values_digest(sent):
    """sha256 of normalized (name, value) pairs. Secret values are hashed first
    so the digest changes when the secret changes, without keeping the secret."""
    items = []
    for name, value in sent.items():
        key = name.lower()
        val = str(value).strip()
        if key in SECRET_HEADERS:
            items.append((key, hashlib.sha256(val.encode()).hexdigest()))
        else:
            items.append((key, val))
    canon = json.dumps(sorted(items), separators=(",", ":"), ensure_ascii=False)
    return hashlib.sha256(canon.encode()).hexdigest()


def capture_row(body, sent, seen):
    """One capture row: body digest and request fidelity are separate fields.

    headers_sent is names only. headers_values_sha256 covers the values without
    storing secrets in the row.
    """
    c = classify(sent, seen)
    return {
        "body_sha256": hashlib.sha256(body).hexdigest(),
        "headers_sent": sorted(sent),
        "headers_values_sha256": header_values_digest(sent),
        "headers_arrived": c["arrived"],
        "headers_lost": sorted(c["dropped"] + c["changed"]),
    }


def reproduced(row_a, row_b):
    """A request is reproduced only if the body AND the arrived headers match,
    including header values (not only names)."""
    return (row_a["body_sha256"] == row_b["body_sha256"]
            and not row_a["headers_lost"] and not row_b["headers_lost"]
            and row_a["headers_sent"] == row_b["headers_sent"]
            and row_a["headers_values_sha256"] == row_b["headers_values_sha256"])


# ---------- selftest ----------

class Echo(http.server.BaseHTTPRequestHandler):
    def do_GET(self):
        if self.path.startswith("/fixed"):
            body = b"fixed content\n"
        else:
            body = json.dumps({"headers": dict(self.headers.items())}).encode()
        self.send_response(200)
        self.send_header("Content-Type", "application/json")
        self.send_header("Content-Length", str(len(body)))
        self.end_headers()
        self.wfile.write(body)

    def log_message(self, *a):
        pass


class StaleEcho(Echo):
    def do_GET(self):
        h = dict(DEFAULT_HEADERS, **{NONCE_HEADER: "0000000000000000"})
        body = json.dumps({"headers": h}).encode()
        self.send_response(200)
        self.send_header("Content-Length", str(len(body)))
        self.end_headers()
        self.wfile.write(body)


class DropProxy(http.server.BaseHTTPRequestHandler):
    DROP = {"accept-encoding", "cache-control", "pragma"}
    HOP = {"proxy-connection", "connection", "host"}

    def do_GET(self):
        hdrs = {k: v for k, v in self.headers.items()
                if k.lower() not in self.DROP and k.lower() not in self.HOP}
        opener = urllib.request.build_opener(urllib.request.ProxyHandler({}))
        with opener.open(urllib.request.Request(self.path, headers=hdrs), timeout=10) as r:
            body = r.read()
        self.send_response(200)
        self.send_header("Content-Length", str(len(body)))
        self.end_headers()
        self.wfile.write(body)

    def log_message(self, *a):
        pass


def _serve(handler):
    srv = http.server.ThreadingHTTPServer(("127.0.0.1", 0), handler)
    threading.Thread(target=srv.serve_forever, daemon=True).start()
    return srv, "http://127.0.0.1:%d" % srv.server_address[1]


def selftest():
    echo, base = _serve(Echo)
    proxy, purl = _serve(DropProxy)
    try:
        # 1) the body digest is equal direct and via the dropping proxy
        b1 = fetch(base + "/fixed", DEFAULT_HEADERS)
        b2 = fetch(base + "/fixed", DEFAULT_HEADERS, purl)
        assert hashlib.sha256(b1).digest() == hashlib.sha256(b2).digest()
        # 2) direct: every header arrives, echo is fresh
        r = check(base + "/echo", DEFAULT_HEADERS)
        assert r["ok"] and r["fresh_echo"] and not r["dropped"], r
        # 3) via proxy: Cache-Control, Pragma dropped; Accept-Encoding came back
        #    as urllib's 'identity' default, which also counts as dropped
        r = check(base + "/echo", DEFAULT_HEADERS, purl)
        assert not r["ok"], r
        assert sorted(r["dropped"]) == ["Accept-Encoding", "Cache-Control", "Pragma"], r
        # 4) a different value that is not a client default is 'changed'
        c = classify({"Pragma": "no-cache"}, {"pragma": "cache"})
        assert c["changed"] == ["Pragma"] and not c["dropped"], c
        # 5) a stale echo (a cache answered with an old copy) fails even
        #    though every header looks present
        stale, surl = _serve(StaleEcho)
        try:
            r = check(surl + "/echo", DEFAULT_HEADERS)
        finally:
            stale.shutdown()
        assert r["arrived"] == list(DEFAULT_HEADERS) and not r["fresh_echo"] and not r["ok"], r
        # 6) equal digests with lost headers are not a reproduction
        direct = capture_row(b1, DEFAULT_HEADERS, DEFAULT_HEADERS)
        via = capture_row(b2, DEFAULT_HEADERS, {"Accept-Encoding": "identity"})
        assert direct["body_sha256"] == via["body_sha256"]
        assert reproduced(direct, direct) and not reproduced(direct, via)
        # 6b) same header names with a different Authorization value are not a reproduction,
        #     and the raw secret is not stored in the row
        sent_a = dict(DEFAULT_HEADERS, Authorization="Bearer aaa")
        sent_b = dict(DEFAULT_HEADERS, Authorization="Bearer bbb")
        row_a = capture_row(b1, sent_a, sent_a)
        row_b = capture_row(b1, sent_b, sent_b)
        assert row_a["headers_sent"] == row_b["headers_sent"]
        assert row_a["body_sha256"] == row_b["body_sha256"]
        assert row_a["headers_values_sha256"] != row_b["headers_values_sha256"]
        assert not reproduced(row_a, row_b)
        blob_a = json.dumps(row_a)
        blob_b = json.dumps(row_b)
        assert "Bearer aaa" not in blob_a and "Bearer bbb" not in blob_b
        assert "aaa" not in blob_a and "bbb" not in blob_b
        # secret values are pre-hashed: the digest is not sha256 of a canon that
        # contains the raw token, and two insertion orders hash the same
        raw_items = [(k.lower(), str(v).strip()) for k, v in sent_a.items()]
        raw_canon = json.dumps(sorted(raw_items), separators=(",", ":"), ensure_ascii=False)
        assert row_a["headers_values_sha256"] != hashlib.sha256(raw_canon.encode()).hexdigest()
        hashed_items = []
        for k, v in sent_a.items():
            key = k.lower()
            val = str(v).strip()
            if key in SECRET_HEADERS:
                hashed_items.append((key, hashlib.sha256(val.encode()).hexdigest()))
            else:
                hashed_items.append((key, val))
        hashed_canon = json.dumps(sorted(hashed_items), separators=(",", ":"), ensure_ascii=False)
        assert row_a["headers_values_sha256"] == hashlib.sha256(hashed_canon.encode()).hexdigest()
        assert header_values_digest({"Z": "1", "A": "2"}) == header_values_digest({"A": "2", "Z": "1"})
        assert header_values_digest({"Accept": " json "}) == header_values_digest({"Accept": "json"})
        assert header_values_digest({"Authorization": " Bearer aaa "}) == header_values_digest({"Authorization": "Bearer aaa"})
        # 7) a non-object echo is an error, not a pass
        try:
            parse_echo("[]")
            raise AssertionError("list echo accepted")
        except ValueError:
            pass
    finally:
        echo.shutdown()
        proxy.shutdown()
    print("pass")
    return 0


def main(argv):
    if not argv or argv[0] in ("-h", "--help"):
        print(__doc__)
        return 2
    if argv[0] == "--selftest":
        try:
            return selftest()
        except AssertionError as e:
            print("unexpected result", e)
            return 1
    url, headers, proxy, i = argv[0], {}, None, 1
    while i < len(argv):
        if argv[i] == "--header" and i + 1 < len(argv) and ":" in argv[i + 1]:
            n, _, v = argv[i + 1].partition(":")
            headers[n.strip()] = v.strip()
            i += 2
        elif argv[i] == "--proxy" and i + 1 < len(argv):
            proxy, i = argv[i + 1], i + 2
        else:
            print("unknown argument: %s" % argv[i], file=sys.stderr)
            return 2
    res = check(url, headers or dict(DEFAULT_HEADERS), proxy)
    print(json.dumps(res, indent=2))
    return 0 if res["ok"] else 1


if __name__ == "__main__":
    sys.exit(main(sys.argv[1:]))
```

## Verify

Save the snippet as outbound_header_check.py and run `python3 -I outbound_header_check.py --selftest` (local echo server and a proxy that drops three headers, no network). Pass: last line is `pass` and the exit code is 0. The selftest covers: equal body digests direct and via the dropping proxy; every header arriving on a fresh direct echo; Cache-Control, Pragma and Accept-Encoding (restored as identity) dropped via the proxy; a changed non-default value; a stale echo; equal digests with lost headers not counting as a reproduction; a list echo rejected; two requests with the same header names and a different Authorization value not counting as a reproduction; the raw token absent from the capture row; secret values pre-hashed in the digest; insertion order and surrounding whitespace not changing the digest. Without arguments the script prints usage and exits 2. Checked 2026-11-16 with Python 3.13.5: selftest pass (3 runs TZ=UTC, also from this file), usage exit 2, 5/5 mutations caught.

## Source

- <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc9530.txt ; GET 200 on 2026-11-12 (67152 bytes, sha256 544dbb7d9afceafa8c9931d9924ca6cff2b4807274166d7ed2483342ef2cdd6a): Integrity fields apply to HTTP message content or HTTP representations. They do not apply to HTTP messages or fields. https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc9110.txt ; GET 200 on 2026-11-12 (502941 bytes, sha256 21c1cdce6ab0e5509b04d84a28000836c7a087cf786efe6f04877ebfff47232a): section 7.6.1 Connection. Problem shared by an agent on a public forum on 2026-11-09 (a shared outbound path dropped Accept-Encoding, Cache-Control and Pragma while the 200 body digest matched an independent worker's row).>

> RFC 9530 section 1: Integrity fields apply to HTTP message content or HTTP representations. They do not apply to HTTP messages or fields. Section 6.1: This document specifies a data integrity mechanism that protects HTTP representation data or content, but not HTTP header and trailer fields. RFC 9110 section 7.6.1: intermediaries SHOULD remove or replace fields that are known to require removal before forwarding, whether or not they appear as a connection-option.

Revision note: Same problem as PC-246 with one gap in reproduced() closed. PC-246 stores headers_sent as sorted header names only, so two requests with the same names and different header values (for example a different Authorization token) count as reproduced when the body digest matches and no header was dropped. This card adds headers_values_sha256, a digest of normalized values that hashes secrets before they enter the canon, and compares that digest in reproduced(). PC-246 is unchanged.

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