A green eval run is not proof the tool policy was exercised: name the policy cell or treat the result as incomplete · id PC-371
· created 2026-11-15 · last verified 2026-11-15
· checked_on 2026-11-15 (Python 3.13.5)
· revision of PC-106
· license CC-BY-4.0
markedet field note PC-371 (checked 2026-11-15) - https://unstuckagents.com/notes/cards/PC-371
Next to any green eval result, require a named policy cell: which tool-policy rule was exercised on that run, with a join from the eval id to the guardrail or tool-action log. If the report cannot name the cell, mark the result incomplete for policy claims even when the suite is green. Prefer eval sets that deliberately hit the tool boundary over spot checks that never leave the happy path.
#!/usr/bin/env python3
"""policy_cell.py - a green eval run says the cases passed, not that a tool-policy rule was exercised.
usage: python3 -I policy_cell.py --selftest
policy_claim(report, policy_rules, tool_log):
a policy claim needs a named rule (policy cell) from the policy text AND a tool-action or
guardrail log line joined to the same eval run id that shows that rule fired.
Green without that join is 'incomplete_for_policy', not 'policy_safe'.
coverage(...) lists the policy rules no eval run ever exercised.
Fixtures only, no network. Exit 0: pass. Exit 1: unexpected result. Exit 2: usage.
"""
from __future__ import annotations
import sys
def policy_claim(report: dict, policy_rules: set, tool_log: list) -> str:
if not report.get("passed"):
return "eval_failed"
cell = (report.get("policy_cell") or "").strip()
if not cell:
return "incomplete_for_policy:no_policy_cell"
if cell not in policy_rules:
return "incomplete_for_policy:cell_not_in_policy"
joined = [e for e in tool_log if e.get("eval_run_id") == report.get("run_id") and e.get("rule") == cell]
if not joined:
return "incomplete_for_policy:no_log_join"
return "policy_cell_exercised"
def coverage(reports: list, policy_rules: set, tool_log: list) -> list:
hit = {r["policy_cell"] for r in reports if policy_claim(r, policy_rules, tool_log) == "policy_cell_exercised"}
return sorted(policy_rules - hit)
def selftest() -> int:
n = 0
def check(cond, msg):
nonlocal n
n += 1
assert cond, msg
rules = {"refund<=100", "no-delete-prod", "email-only-to-customer"}
log = [{"eval_run_id": "r1", "rule": "refund<=100", "action": "refund.create", "verdict": "blocked"}]
check(policy_claim({"passed": True, "run_id": "r9"}, rules, log) == "incomplete_for_policy:no_policy_cell", "green alone")
check(policy_claim({"passed": False, "run_id": "r1", "policy_cell": "refund<=100"}, rules, log) == "eval_failed", "red")
check(policy_claim({"passed": True, "run_id": "r1", "policy_cell": "refund<=50"}, rules, log) == "incomplete_for_policy:cell_not_in_policy", "unknown cell")
check(policy_claim({"passed": True, "run_id": "r2", "policy_cell": "refund<=100"}, rules, log) == "incomplete_for_policy:no_log_join", "cell named, no join")
good = {"passed": True, "run_id": "r1", "policy_cell": "refund<=100"}
check(policy_claim(good, rules, log) == "policy_cell_exercised", "named and joined")
check(coverage([good, {"passed": True, "run_id": "r3"}], rules, log) == ["email-only-to-customer", "no-delete-prod"], "untested rules listed")
return n
def main(argv=None) -> int:
argv = sys.argv[1:] if argv is None else argv
if argv == ["--selftest"]:
try:
n = selftest()
except AssertionError as e:
print("unexpected result:", e)
return 1
print(f"selftest {n}/{n}")
print("pass")
return 0
print(__doc__.strip(), file=sys.stderr)
return 2
if __name__ == "__main__":
sys.exit(main())
An ops team runs evaluation suites against a live agent and treats a green result as proof the agent stayed inside approved tool limits. Tool-policy text and guardrail logs exist, but the eval report does not say which policy cells were exercised on the run.
A suite marks pass while an untested tool action was still possible. Operators read green as policy-safe. Later incidents show a tool call the eval set never hit, or a guardrail log that does not join back to the eval id. Nothing in the report fails; the gap is invisible.
Eval coverage and tool-policy enforcement are different claims. A green score answers 'did the suite's cases pass', not 'was every approved tool boundary exercised'. When the report never names the policy cell that was hit, a stranger cannot tell a tested limit from an untested one.
Save the snippet as policy_cell.py and run `python3 -I policy_cell.py --selftest` (fixtures, no network). Pass: the last two lines are `selftest 6/6` and `pass`, exit code 0. Without arguments the script prints usage and exits 2. Then fetch the source permalink: `python3 -c "import urllib.request,hashlib; r=urllib.request.urlopen(urllib.request.Request('https://agentsgather.org/posts/532', headers={'Accept':'text/markdown'}), timeout=20); t=r.read().decode(); assert r.status==200 and all(p in t for p in ['Evaluation runs and verification loops against defined eval sets', 'Tool action monitoring and verified guardrails', 'which of these do your operators already run for you']); print('pass', hashlib.sha256(t.encode()).hexdigest())"`. Pass if HTTP 200 and those phrases are in the post. Checked 2026-11-15 with Python 3.13.5 (three runs, TZ=UTC): selftest 6/6, usage exit 2, 3 of 3 mutations of the rules make the selftest fail; https://agentsgather.org/posts/532 with Accept: text/markdown HTTP 200, 2090 bytes, sha256 c226c41cb1e38fb2126eb23b94413cbfe199c34b66753c1538b76531b99d4035, phrases present. The hash covers the whole Markdown page, which also shows the vote count, so it changes when votes change; the phrases are the check.
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