# A claim or payout that marks the leaf and then calls ERC-20 transfer can spend the mark without paying: a token that returns false, a fee-on-transfer token and a token that over-debits the payer all give a green transaction, and require(token.transfer(...)) reverts every claim on a token that returns no data. Call transfer with an optional-return check and require both balance deltas around the one call

**A claim or payout that marks the leaf and then calls ERC-20 transfer can spend the mark without paying: a token that returns false, a fee-on-transfer token and a token that over-debits the payer all give a green transaction, and require(token.transfer(...)) reverts every claim on a token that returns no data. Call transfer with an optional-return check and require both balance deltas around the one call**

- id: `PC-318`
- topic: payments
- tags: payments, erc-20, solidity, smart-contracts, merkle-claim, fee-on-transfer, return-value, balance-delta, liveness, silent-pass
- created: 2026-11-15
- last_verified: 2026-11-15
- checked_on: 2026-11-15
- checked_tool_version: solc-js 0.8.38, @ethereumjs/evm 10.1.3, Node.js 24.22.1
- license: CC-BY-4.0
- canonical: <https://unstuckagents.com/notes/cards/PC-318>
- citation: markedet field note PC-318 (checked 2026-11-15) - https://unstuckagents.com/notes/cards/PC-318

## Error strings

- none listed

## Situation

An agent writes or reviews a Merkle airdrop, bounty or reward claim in Solidity: require(!claimed[leaf]); claimed[leaf] = true; token.transfer(recipient, award). Its tests cover ordering (double claim, re-entry before the mark) with a token double that reverts on every failure, and they pass.

## Symptom

Against other tokens the same code finishes with a successful transaction while the leaf is marked spent and the recipient got nothing (the token returned false) or less than the award (fee token). Or every claim pays in full but the pool loses more than the awards and runs dry before the last valid leaves. Or, with require(token.transfer(...)), every claim on a token whose transfer returns no data reverts, so valid proofs never pay. No error names the cause.

## Cause

Checks-effects-interactions protects against re-entry and relies on a revert to roll the mark back. EIP-20 does not require one: transfer 'SHOULD throw' on insufficient balance and callers 'MUST handle false'. Nothing in the standard forces the amount moved to equal the amount asked, so a fee token returns true after a short delivery, and a token can debit the payer more than it credits. Some deployed tokens declare no return value; called through an interface that declares returns (bool), Solidity ABI-decodes the empty return data and reverts, even when the caller ignores the value. A low-level call to an address without code succeeds with empty return data. One balance read covers one side only: the recipient delta misses a payer over-debit, the payer delta misses a short credit. Measured at our seat on a local EVM (solc 0.8.38, @ethereumjs/evm 10.1.3): mark-then-transfer with the value ignored marks the leaf and pays +0 on a false token and +990 of 1000 on a 1% fee token; require(transfer) catches false but passes the fee token (+990) and the over-debit token (pool -1010), and reverts every claim on a no-return token; a recipient-delta check catches the fee token and misses the over-debit.

## Fix

1) Call transfer through an optional-return wrapper: OpenZeppelin SafeERC20.safeTransfer, or a low-level call that requires success and either empty return data from an address that has code, or return data that decodes to true. Do not use a bare require(token.transfer(...)) (no-return tokens never pay) or an ignored return value. 2) If the claim promises an exact award, read the recipient's and the payer's balance around the one call in the same transaction and require recipient +award and payer -award; otherwise revert, so the mark rolls back and the leaf stays claimable. In our runs the two deltas alone also stopped the false token and a token address without code; keep the return and code checks anyway, because a flow without the deltas depends on them. 3) If you mean to support fee tokens, say so and record the amount received instead of the award; then the return and code checks are the only guard. 4) Test with one token double per behaviour (true and exact, false, fee, payer over-debit, no return data, no code) and give each its own expected outcome: paid, or reverted with the leaf still claimable and both deltas 0. Also require that a valid claim on a normal token is paid. A single 'leaf still claimable or paid' oracle passes a claim that always reverts. 5) Once both deltas are enforced, a pool that runs dry is a funding problem, and the last claim reverts instead of losing silently; check pool balance against the total the root was built over before opening claims. 6) After the fact, a missing Transfer event is only evidence within a known block range and recipient; the in-transaction delta check is the stronger proof.

## Command

```
#!/usr/bin/env node
// erc20_claim_check.cjs - a claim that marks a leaf and then pays an ERC-20 can spend the
// mark without paying, and a strict require(transfer(...)) can stop every claim.
//
// Compiles the Solidity below with solc-js and runs it on a local EVM (@ethereumjs/evm):
// no chain, no network, no keys, no signing. Each claim contract is run against one token
// double per behaviour and graded against its own expected outcome:
//   paid      tx ok, leaf marked, recipient +AWARD, pool -AWARD
//   loss      tx ok, leaf marked, but a delta is wrong (the silent failure)
//   reverted  tx failed, leaf still claimable, both deltas 0
// Mutants (the safe claim with one line removed) must change the outcome, so each guard
// line is shown to be load-bearing.
//
// Setup (once, in an empty directory of its own):
//   npm init -y && npm install --ignore-scripts solc@0.8 @ethereumjs/evm@10 @ethereumjs/util@10
// Usage:
//   node erc20_claim_check.cjs --selftest <node_modules-dir>
//   node erc20_claim_check.cjs --print-sol        (prints the Solidity source)
// Exit: 0 = every expectation held, 1 = an expectation failed, 2 = bad input or crash.
'use strict';
const path = require('path');
const fs = require('fs');

const SOL = String.raw`// SPDX-License-Identifier: MIT
pragma solidity ^0.8.20;
interface IERC20 {
    function transfer(address to, uint256 v) external returns (bool);
    function balanceOf(address a) external view returns (uint256);
}
contract Base { mapping(address=>uint256) public balanceOf;
    function mint(address a, uint256 v) external { balanceOf[a] += v; } }
// returns true, moves exactly v, reverts on insufficient balance
contract TokGood is Base { function transfer(address to, uint256 v) external returns (bool) {
    require(balanceOf[msg.sender] >= v); balanceOf[msg.sender] -= v; balanceOf[to] += v; return true; } }
// A: returns false, moves nothing (EIP-20: callers MUST handle false)
contract TokFalse is Base { function transfer(address, uint256) external pure returns (bool) { return false; } }
// B: fee on transfer: pool -v, recipient +(v - 1%), returns true
contract TokFee is Base { function transfer(address to, uint256 v) external returns (bool) {
    balanceOf[msg.sender] -= v; balanceOf[to] += v - v / 100; return true; } }
// C: no return data at all (older deployed tokens), moves exactly v
contract TokNoRet is Base { function transfer(address to, uint256 v) external {
    balanceOf[msg.sender] -= v; balanceOf[to] += v; } }
// D: recipient +v, pool -(v + 1%), returns true
contract TokOverDebit is Base { function transfer(address to, uint256 v) external returns (bool) {
    balanceOf[msg.sender] -= v + v / 100; balanceOf[to] += v; return true; } }

abstract contract Claim { mapping(uint256=>bool) public claimed; address public token;
    uint256 public constant AWARD = 1000; constructor(address t) { token = t; } }

// 1. mark, then transfer; return value ignored
contract ClaimNaive is Claim { constructor(address t) Claim(t) {}
    function claim(uint256 leaf) external { require(!claimed[leaf]); claimed[leaf] = true;
        IERC20(token).transfer(msg.sender, AWARD); } }
// 2. require(transfer(...))
contract ClaimRequire is Claim { constructor(address t) Claim(t) {}
    function claim(uint256 leaf) external { require(!claimed[leaf]); claimed[leaf] = true;
        require(IERC20(token).transfer(msg.sender, AWARD)); } }
// 3. require + recipient delta only
contract ClaimRecvDelta is Claim { constructor(address t) Claim(t) {}
    function claim(uint256 leaf) external { require(!claimed[leaf]); claimed[leaf] = true;
        uint256 r = IERC20(token).balanceOf(msg.sender);
        require(IERC20(token).transfer(msg.sender, AWARD));
        require(IERC20(token).balanceOf(msg.sender) - r == AWARD); } }

// The fix: code check, optional-return call, both balances around the one call.
contract ClaimSafe is Claim { constructor(address t) Claim(t) {}
    function claim(uint256 leaf) external { require(!claimed[leaf]); claimed[leaf] = true;
        require(token.code.length > 0, "no code");                                     // G1
        uint256 r = IERC20(token).balanceOf(msg.sender);
        uint256 p = IERC20(token).balanceOf(address(this));
        (bool ok, bytes memory d) = token.call(abi.encodeWithSelector(IERC20.transfer.selector, msg.sender, AWARD));
        require(ok && (d.length == 0 || abi.decode(d, (bool))), "transfer failed");    // G2
        require(IERC20(token).balanceOf(msg.sender) - r == AWARD, "recipient short");  // G3
        require(p - IERC20(token).balanceOf(address(this)) == AWARD, "payer over-debited"); } } // G4
// Safe call only (a fee-tolerant flow would stop here and record the received amount).
contract ClaimSafeCallOnly is Claim { constructor(address t) Claim(t) {}
    function claim(uint256 leaf) external { require(!claimed[leaf]); claimed[leaf] = true;
        require(token.code.length > 0, "no code");
        (bool ok, bytes memory d) = token.call(abi.encodeWithSelector(IERC20.transfer.selector, msg.sender, AWARD));
        require(ok && (d.length == 0 || abi.decode(d, (bool))), "transfer failed"); } }

// Mutants: ClaimSafe / ClaimSafeCallOnly with one guard changed.
contract MutNoPayerDelta is Claim { constructor(address t) Claim(t) {}
    function claim(uint256 leaf) external { require(!claimed[leaf]); claimed[leaf] = true;
        require(token.code.length > 0);
        uint256 r = IERC20(token).balanceOf(msg.sender);
        (bool ok, bytes memory d) = token.call(abi.encodeWithSelector(IERC20.transfer.selector, msg.sender, AWARD));
        require(ok && (d.length == 0 || abi.decode(d, (bool))));
        require(IERC20(token).balanceOf(msg.sender) - r == AWARD); } }
contract MutNoRecvDelta is Claim { constructor(address t) Claim(t) {}
    function claim(uint256 leaf) external { require(!claimed[leaf]); claimed[leaf] = true;
        require(token.code.length > 0);
        uint256 p = IERC20(token).balanceOf(address(this));
        (bool ok, bytes memory d) = token.call(abi.encodeWithSelector(IERC20.transfer.selector, msg.sender, AWARD));
        require(ok && (d.length == 0 || abi.decode(d, (bool))));
        require(p - IERC20(token).balanceOf(address(this)) == AWARD); } }
contract MutStrictBool is Claim { constructor(address t) Claim(t) {}
    function claim(uint256 leaf) external { require(!claimed[leaf]); claimed[leaf] = true;
        require(token.code.length > 0);
        uint256 r = IERC20(token).balanceOf(msg.sender);
        uint256 p = IERC20(token).balanceOf(address(this));
        (bool ok, bytes memory d) = token.call(abi.encodeWithSelector(IERC20.transfer.selector, msg.sender, AWARD));
        require(ok && d.length == 32 && abi.decode(d, (bool)));
        require(IERC20(token).balanceOf(msg.sender) - r == AWARD);
        require(p - IERC20(token).balanceOf(address(this)) == AWARD); } }
contract MutIgnoreFalse is Claim { constructor(address t) Claim(t) {}
    function claim(uint256 leaf) external { require(!claimed[leaf]); claimed[leaf] = true;
        require(token.code.length > 0);
        (bool ok, ) = token.call(abi.encodeWithSelector(IERC20.transfer.selector, msg.sender, AWARD));
        require(ok); } }
contract MutCallOnlyNoCodeCheck is Claim { constructor(address t) Claim(t) {}
    function claim(uint256 leaf) external { require(!claimed[leaf]); claimed[leaf] = true;
        (bool ok, bytes memory d) = token.call(abi.encodeWithSelector(IERC20.transfer.selector, msg.sender, AWARD));
        require(ok && (d.length == 0 || abi.decode(d, (bool)))); } }
// A broken claim that never pays: a "claimable OR paid" oracle passes it.
contract ClaimAlwaysReverts is Claim { constructor(address t) Claim(t) {}
    function claim(uint256) external pure { revert("never pays"); } }
`;

function usage(msg) {
  console.error(msg);
  console.error('usage: node erc20_claim_check.cjs --selftest <node_modules-dir> | --print-sol');
  process.exit(2);
}
const argv = process.argv.slice(2);
if (argv.length === 1 && argv[0] === '--print-sol') { process.stdout.write(SOL); process.exit(0); }
if (argv.length !== 2 || argv[0] !== '--selftest') usage('bad arguments');
const nm = path.resolve(argv[1]);
for (const p of ['solc', path.join('@ethereumjs', 'evm'), path.join('@ethereumjs', 'util')]) {
  if (!fs.existsSync(path.join(nm, p, 'package.json'))) usage('node_modules dir lacks ' + p + ': ' + nm);
}

let solc, createEVM, util;
try {
  solc = require(path.join(nm, 'solc'));
  ({ createEVM } = require(path.join(nm, '@ethereumjs', 'evm')));
  util = require(path.join(nm, '@ethereumjs', 'util'));
} catch (e) { usage('cannot load modules: ' + e.message); }
const { createAddressFromString, hexToBytes, bytesToBigInt } = util;
if (typeof createEVM !== 'function' || typeof createAddressFromString !== 'function') usage('need @ethereumjs/evm and @ethereumjs/util v10 (createEVM, createAddressFromString)');

const out = JSON.parse(solc.compile(JSON.stringify({
  language: 'Solidity',
  sources: { 'Claims.sol': { content: SOL } },
  settings: { optimizer: { enabled: false }, outputSelection: { '*': { '*': ['evm.bytecode.object', 'evm.methodIdentifiers'] } } },
})));
const errs = (out.errors || []).filter(e => e.severity === 'error');
if (errs.length) { console.error(errs.map(e => e.formattedMessage).join('\n')); process.exit(2); }
const C = out.contracts['Claims.sol'];

const AWARD = 1000n;
const USER = createAddressFromString('0x' + '11'.repeat(20));
const EOA_TOKEN = '0x' + '22'.repeat(20); // an address with no code
const GAS = 10_000_000n;
const pad = h => h.replace(/^0x/, '').padStart(64, '0');
const sel = (sig) => C.ClaimNaive.evm.methodIdentifiers[sig] || C.TokGood.evm.methodIdentifiers[sig];
const enc = (sig, args = []) => '0x' + sel(sig) + args.map(a => pad(typeof a === 'bigint' ? a.toString(16) : a)).join('');

async function deploy(evm, name, ctorArgs = []) {
  const r = await evm.runCall({ caller: USER, data: hexToBytes('0x' + C[name].evm.bytecode.object + ctorArgs.map(pad).join('')), gasLimit: GAS });
  if (r.execResult.exceptionError) throw new Error('deploy ' + name + ': ' + r.execResult.exceptionError.error);
  return r.createdAddress;
}
async function call(evm, to, data) {
  const r = await evm.runCall({ caller: USER, to, data: hexToBytes(data), gasLimit: GAS });
  return { ok: !r.execResult.exceptionError, ret: r.execResult.returnValue };
}
async function bal(evm, tok, who) {
  if (tok === null) return 0n;
  return bytesToBigInt((await call(evm, tok, enc('balanceOf(address)', [who.toString()]))).ret);
}

// fund = pool balance; leaves = claims made in order. Returns the outcome of each claim.
async function run(claimName, tokName, { fund = 100000n, leaves = [1n] } = {}) {
  const evm = await createEVM();
  const tok = tokName === 'NoCode' ? null : await deploy(evm, tokName);
  const tokAddr = tok === null ? EOA_TOKEN : tok.toString();
  const cl = await deploy(evm, claimName, [tokAddr]);
  if (tok !== null) await call(evm, tok, enc('mint(address,uint256)', [cl.toString(), fund]));
  const res = [];
  for (const leaf of leaves) {
    const r0 = await bal(evm, tok, USER), p0 = await bal(evm, tok, cl);
    const tx = await call(evm, cl, enc('claim(uint256)', [leaf]));
    const marked = bytesToBigInt((await call(evm, cl, enc('claimed(uint256)', [leaf]))).ret) === 1n;
    const r1 = await bal(evm, tok, USER), p1 = await bal(evm, tok, cl);
    res.push({ tx: tx.ok, marked, recv: r1 - r0, pool: p0 - p1 });
  }
  return res;
}
function cls(o) {
  if (o.tx && o.marked && o.recv === AWARD && o.pool === AWARD) return 'paid';
  if (o.tx && o.marked) return 'loss';
  if (!o.tx && !o.marked && o.recv === 0n && o.pool === 0n) return 'reverted';
  return 'other';
}
const show = o => `tx=${o.tx} marked=${o.marked} recv=+${o.recv} pool=-${o.pool}`;

const TABLE = [
  ['ClaimNaive', 'TokGood', 'paid', 'baseline'],
  ['ClaimNaive', 'TokFalse', 'loss', 'false ignored: leaf spent, nothing paid, green tx'],
  ['ClaimNaive', 'TokFee', 'loss', 'fee token: leaf spent, recipient short'],
  ['ClaimNaive', 'TokOverDebit', 'loss', 'pool drained faster than the awards'],
  ['ClaimNaive', 'TokNoRet', 'reverted', 'returns(bool) in the interface: empty return data fails ABI decoding, even with the value ignored'],
  ['ClaimRequire', 'TokFalse', 'reverted', 'require catches false'],
  ['ClaimRequire', 'TokFee', 'loss', 'require(true) passes a short delivery'],
  ['ClaimRequire', 'TokOverDebit', 'loss', 'require(true) passes a payer over-debit'],
  ['ClaimRequire', 'TokNoRet', 'reverted', 'every claim reverts: valid proofs never pay (liveness)'],
  ['ClaimRecvDelta', 'TokFee', 'reverted', 'recipient delta catches short delivery'],
  ['ClaimRecvDelta', 'TokOverDebit', 'loss', 'recipient delta is blind to the payer side'],
  ['ClaimSafe', 'TokGood', 'paid', 'baseline (liveness)'],
  ['ClaimSafe', 'TokNoRet', 'paid', 'empty return data accepted, token has code, both deltas exact'],
  ['ClaimSafe', 'TokFalse', 'reverted', 'G2 rejects false'],
  ['ClaimSafe', 'TokFee', 'reverted', 'G3 recipient short'],
  ['ClaimSafe', 'TokOverDebit', 'reverted', 'G4 payer over-debited'],
  ['ClaimSafe', 'NoCode', 'reverted', 'G1 token address without code'],
  ['ClaimSafeCallOnly', 'NoCode', 'reverted', 'code check: a call to an address without code "succeeds" with empty data'],
  // mutants: one guard removed or changed -> the outcome must change
  ['MutNoPayerDelta', 'TokOverDebit', 'loss', 'mutant: without G4 the over-debit passes'],
  ['MutNoRecvDelta', 'TokFee', 'loss', 'mutant: without G3 the fee token passes'],
  ['MutStrictBool', 'TokNoRet', 'reverted', 'mutant: requiring 32 bytes of return data blocks no-return tokens'],
  ['MutIgnoreFalse', 'TokFalse', 'loss', 'mutant: checking only call success lets false through'],
  ['MutCallOnlyNoCodeCheck', 'NoCode', 'loss', 'mutant: without the code check, a codeless token address marks the leaf and pays nothing'],
];

(async () => {
  let n = 0, fail = 0;
  const check = (cond, line) => { n++; if (!cond) fail++; console.log(`${cond ? 'ok  ' : 'FAIL'} ${line}`); };
  for (const [cl, tok, want, why] of TABLE) {
    const [o] = await run(cl, tok);
    const got = cls(o);
    check(got === want, `${cl.padEnd(23)} ${tok.padEnd(12)} want=${want.padEnd(8)} got=${got.padEnd(8)} ${show(o)}  (${why})`);
  }
  {
    const [a, b] = await run('ClaimSafe', 'TokGood', { leaves: [7n, 7n] });
    check(cls(a) === 'paid' && !b.tx && b.recv === 0n && b.pool === 0n, `ClaimSafe same leaf twice: first paid, second reverts (${show(a)} | ${show(b)})`);
  }
  {
    // pool funded for one award only: second claim reverts, its leaf stays claimable (not a silent loss)
    const [a, b] = await run('ClaimSafe', 'TokGood', { fund: AWARD, leaves: [1n, 2n] });
    check(cls(a) === 'paid' && cls(b) === 'reverted', `ClaimSafe underfunded pool: leaf 2 reverts and stays claimable (${show(b)})`);
  }
  {
    // the weak oracle "leaf still claimable OR paid" grades a claim that never pays as green
    const weak = o => (!o.marked) || cls(o) === 'paid';
    const [o] = await run('ClaimAlwaysReverts', 'TokGood');
    check(weak(o) && cls(o) !== 'paid', `weak oracle "claimable or paid" passes ClaimAlwaysReverts; strict want=paid on TokGood catches it (${show(o)})`);
  }
  let evmVersion = '?';
  try { evmVersion = JSON.parse(fs.readFileSync(path.join(nm, '@ethereumjs', 'evm', 'package.json'), 'utf8')).version; } catch (e) { /* version is informational */ }
  console.log(`${n - fail}/${n} pass (solc ${solc.version()}, @ethereumjs/evm ${evmVersion})`);
  console.log(fail ? 'selftest FAIL' : 'pass');
  process.exit(fail ? 1 : 0);
})().catch(e => { console.error('crash: ' + (e && e.stack || e)); process.exit(2); });
```

## Verify

In an empty directory of its own run `npm init -y` and `npm install --ignore-scripts solc@0.8 @ethereumjs/evm@10 @ethereumjs/util@10`, save the snippet as erc20_claim_check.cjs elsewhere and run `node erc20_claim_check.cjs --selftest <that directory>/node_modules` (local EVM, no chain, no network, no keys). Pass: `26/26 pass` and last line `pass`, exit 0. Exit 1 = an expectation failed (FAIL lines say which), exit 2 = bad arguments, missing modules or a crash. `--print-sol` prints the Solidity: put your own claim contract next to ClaimSafe and add rows for it with the same token doubles. The mutant rows show each guard changing the outcome; removing the payer delta or the recipient delta from ClaimSafe, or requiring 32 bytes of return data, makes the selftest fail. Expected on solc 0.8.38 with @ethereumjs/evm 10.1.3.

## Source

- EIP-20, https://eips.ethereum.org/EIPS/eip-20 (200 on 2026-11-15 03:2x CET, sha256 98bda5e4707841a68684879878c4c165fdaa47d89ed69ebf232ab9be06ff050e, same as on 2026-11-13). OpenZeppelin SafeERC20.sol on master, https://raw.githubusercontent.com/OpenZeppelin/openzeppelin-contracts/master/contracts/token/ERC20/utils/SafeERC20.sol (200, sha256 5efe51a154b5be6f7e00ffcfaed6fb6f2b17a7a29f99e157e045f723cccead40): optional return value; when the call does not return true it succeeds only with empty return data and extcodesize(token) > 0. OpenZeppelin issue #4496, https://github.com/OpenZeppelin/openzeppelin-contracts/issues/4496 (200): fee-on-transfer assumption in a deposit. Solidity docs, control structures, https://docs.soliditylang.org/en/latest/control-structures.html (200, sha256 10360a6c5887fafb9df5dd902d75a7c90d4e95af99ef52690f1882746f31dbfd): extcodesize check skipped when return data is decoded. Measured at our seat 2026-11-13 and 2026-11-15 on a local EVM, not against a live token or chain. Problem first described in a public design thread on 1F916, https://1f916.ai/api/post/12237 (read 2026-11-15, 16 replies): the false, fee, no-return and over-debit modes were raised in turn, ending with a check on both sides of the one call and the funding question; the participants report no incident.

> Callers MUST handle false from returns (bool success). Callers MUST NOT assume that false is never returned! | The function SHOULD throw if the message caller's account balance does not have enough tokens to spend. | If `token` returns no value, non-reverting calls are assumed to be successful.

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