An agent's guess about its scope is not permission: log the grant entry it relied on, its own inference and its choice as three separate fields, and stop instead of annotating when the guess would publish, spend, share private data or delete

An agent's guess about its scope is not permission: log the grant entry it relied on, its own inference and its choice as three separate fields, and stop instead of annotating when the guess would publish, spend, share private data or delete · id PC-302 · created 2026-11-15 · last verified 2026-11-15 · checked_on 2026-11-15 · license CC-BY-4.0

markedet field note PC-302 (checked 2026-11-15) - https://unstuckagents.com/notes/cards/PC-302

Fix

1) Keep the grant as named entries (g1-explore: explore on any venue; g2-publish-A: publish on venue A only). 2) Every action record has scope_ref (the entry it relied on, or null), inference (text or null, never permission) and choice (done, prepared, stopped). 3) scope_ref must name an entry that itself covers the kind and venue; another entry covering it does not repair a wrong reference. 4) A widening kind (publish, spend, share_private, delete, or any kind you did not list as reversible) without a covering entry: stopped, and the question goes to the owner. No annotate-and-continue. 5) A reversible kind (explore, draft) without a grant: only prepared, kept local. 6) A covered step done without scope_ref is a finding too. 7) Audit from the grant and the records alone.

Command

#!/usr/bin/env python3
"""scope_log_check.py - can an auditor tell what the owner granted from what the agent guessed?

An agent acting for an owner logs its steps. If the log only says "authorized: true", nobody can
later tell a step the grant covered from a step the agent inferred was fine. This script audits a
log where every action keeps three things apart:

  scope_ref   the name of the grant entry the step relied on, or null
  inference   the agent's own reading of the scope (free text) or null; never counts as permission
  choice      done | prepared | stopped

Input (JSON object):
  {"grant": {"<entry name>": {"kinds": ["publish", ...], "venues": ["A", ...] or ["*"]}, ...},
   "reversible_kinds": ["explore", "draft"],   # optional; every other kind counts as widening
   "actions": [{"venue": "B", "kind": "publish", "scope_ref": null,
                "inference": "B looks like A", "choice": "stopped"}, ...]}

Rules per action:
  R1 a scope_ref must name a grant entry, and that entry itself must cover kind@venue
     (another entry covering it does not repair a wrong reference);
  R2 a step the grant covers that is done without a scope_ref is a finding: log the source;
  R3 a widening kind (anything not listed as reversible: publish, spend, share_private, delete,
     or a kind you did not list) without a covering scope_ref: choice must be stopped;
     no annotate-and-continue, no 'prepared' (prepare it as a reversible kind instead);
  R4 a reversible kind without a covering scope_ref: only prepared (kept local) or stopped;
  R5 choice must be one of done, prepared, stopped; inference must be text or null.
The grant itself must come from the owner, not from the agent; this script cannot check that.

Exit 0: clean; 1: violations printed; 2: usage or bad input.
Usage: python3 -I scope_log_check.py log.json | --selftest
"""
import json
import random
import sys

DEFAULT_REVERSIBLE = ("explore", "draft")
CHOICES = ("done", "prepared", "stopped")


def load_grant(grant):
    if not isinstance(grant, dict) or not grant:
        raise ValueError("grant must be a non-empty object of named entries")
    out = {}
    for name, g in grant.items():
        if not isinstance(g, dict):
            raise ValueError("grant entry %r must be an object" % name)
        kinds, venues = g.get("kinds"), g.get("venues")
        for label, v in (("kinds", kinds), ("venues", venues)):
            if not isinstance(v, list) or not v or not all(isinstance(x, str) and x for x in v):
                raise ValueError("grant entry %r: %s must be a non-empty list of strings" % (name, label))
        out[name] = (set(kinds), set(venues))
    return out


def entry_covers(entry, venue, kind):
    kinds, venues = entry
    return kind in kinds and (venue in venues or "*" in venues)


def audit(grant, actions, reversible=DEFAULT_REVERSIBLE):
    """Return a list of (index, rule, problem). Raises ValueError on input that is not a log."""
    g = load_grant(grant)
    if not isinstance(actions, list):
        raise ValueError("actions must be a list")
    rev = set(reversible)
    bad = []
    for i, a in enumerate(actions):
        if not isinstance(a, dict):
            raise ValueError("action %d must be an object" % i)
        missing = [f for f in ("venue", "kind", "scope_ref", "inference", "choice") if f not in a]
        if missing:
            bad.append((i, "R5", "missing field(s) %s" % ", ".join(missing)))
            continue
        venue, kind, ref, inf, choice = a["venue"], a["kind"], a["scope_ref"], a["inference"], a["choice"]
        if not isinstance(venue, str) or not venue or not isinstance(kind, str) or not kind:
            raise ValueError("action %d: venue and kind must be non-empty strings" % i)
        if choice not in CHOICES:
            bad.append((i, "R5", "choice %r is not one of %s" % (choice, "/".join(CHOICES))))
            continue
        if inf is not None and not isinstance(inf, str):
            bad.append((i, "R5", "inference must be text or null"))
            continue
        if ref is not None:
            if not isinstance(ref, str) or ref not in g:
                bad.append((i, "R1", "scope_ref %r names no grant entry" % (ref,)))
                continue
            if not entry_covers(g[ref], venue, kind):
                bad.append((i, "R1", "scope_ref %r does not cover %s@%s" % (ref, kind, venue)))
                continue
            continue  # covered by the entry it names: any choice is fine
        real = [n for n, e in g.items() if entry_covers(e, venue, kind)]
        if real:
            if choice == "done":
                bad.append((i, "R2", "done without scope_ref although %r covers it: log the source" % real[0]))
            continue
        if kind not in rev:
            if choice != "stopped":
                bad.append((i, "R3", "%s@%s is widening and not granted, choice=%s: must be stopped"
                            % (kind, venue, choice)))
        elif choice == "done":
            bad.append((i, "R4", "%s@%s not granted, choice=done: only prepared (local) or stopped"
                        % (kind, venue)))
    return bad


# ---------------------------------------------------------------- self-test

GRANT = {
    "g1-explore": {"kinds": ["explore"], "venues": ["*"]},
    "g1b-draft-AB": {"kinds": ["draft"], "venues": ["A", "B"]},
    "g2-publish-A": {"kinds": ["publish"], "venues": ["A"]},
}
KINDS = ["delete", "draft", "explore", "publish", "share_private", "spend"]


def simulate(seed=7, n=40):
    g = load_grant(GRANT)
    rnd = random.Random(seed)
    acts = []
    for _ in range(n):
        venue, kind = rnd.choice("ABC"), rnd.choice(KINDS)
        real = next((name for name, e in g.items() if entry_covers(e, venue, kind)), None)
        inferred = real is None and rnd.random() < 0.6  # "B is like A", "a small spend is implied"
        acts.append({"venue": venue, "kind": kind, "real": real, "inferred": inferred})
    return acts


def three_field(acts, follow_rule):
    out = []
    for a in acts:
        if a["real"]:
            out.append({"venue": a["venue"], "kind": a["kind"], "scope_ref": a["real"],
                        "inference": None, "choice": "done"})
        elif a["inferred"]:
            if not follow_rule:
                choice = "done"
            else:
                choice = "prepared" if a["kind"] in DEFAULT_REVERSIBLE else "stopped"
            out.append({"venue": a["venue"], "kind": a["kind"], "scope_ref": None,
                        "inference": "assumed %s on %s is like the grant" % (a["kind"], a["venue"]),
                        "choice": choice})
    return out


def selftest():
    ok = True
    acts = simulate()
    granted = sum(1 for a in acts if a["real"])
    inferred = sum(1 for a in acts if a["inferred"])
    widening = sum(1 for a in acts if a["inferred"] and a["kind"] not in DEFAULT_REVERSIBLE)
    one = [{"venue": a["venue"], "kind": a["kind"], "authorized": True} for a in acts if a["real"] or a["inferred"]]
    attributable = sum(1 for r in one if "scope_ref" in r)
    print("simulated: %d steps, %d covered by the grant, %d inferred only (%d widening)"
          % (len(acts), granted, inferred, widening))
    print("one-field log: %d rows, all authorized=true, rows that name a grant entry: %d" % (len(one), attributable))
    good = three_field(acts, True)
    v_good = audit(GRANT, good)
    acted = three_field(acts, False)
    v_acted = audit(GRANT, acted)
    print("three-field log, stop rule kept: %d rows, %d violations" % (len(good), len(v_good)))
    print("three-field log, inference acted on: %d rows, %d violations" % (len(acted), len(v_acted)))
    ok &= len(one) == granted + inferred and attributable == 0 and widening > 0
    ok &= not v_good and len(v_acted) == inferred

    def rec(venue, kind, ref, choice, inf=None):
        return {"venue": venue, "kind": kind, "scope_ref": ref, "inference": inf, "choice": choice}

    cases = [  # (record, rule expected or None)
        (rec("A", "publish", "g2-publish-A", "done"), None),
        (rec("A", "publish", "g2-publish-A", "done", "owner said A"), None),     # inference beside a real ref
        (rec("A", "explore", "g1-explore", "stopped"), None),                    # stopping is always allowed
        (rec("B", "publish", None, "stopped", "B looks like A"), None),
        (rec("C", "draft", None, "prepared", "harmless"), None),
        (rec("C", "draft", None, "stopped"), None),
        (rec("A", "draft", None, "prepared"), None),                             # covered, not done: fine
        (rec("B", "publish", "g2-publish-A", "done"), "R1"),                     # ref does not cover venue
        (rec("A", "publish", "g9", "done"), "R1"),                               # unknown entry
        (rec("A", "publish", "g1-explore", "done"), "R1"),                       # wrong entry, another covers
        (rec("A", "publish", ["g2-publish-A"], "done"), "R1"),                   # ref not a string
        (rec("A", "explore", None, "done"), "R2"),                               # covered but no source logged
        (rec("C", "spend", None, "done", "small amount"), "R3"),
        (rec("C", "spend", None, "prepared", "small amount"), "R3"),
        (rec("C", "delete", None, "done"), "R3"),
        (rec("C", "share_private", None, "done", "they shared it first"), "R3"),
        (rec("C", "invite", None, "done"), "R3"),                                # unlisted kind = widening
        (rec("C", "draft", None, "done", "harmless"), "R4"),
        (rec("C", "spend", None, "annotated", "small amount"), "R5"),
        (rec("A", "publish", "g2-publish-A", "annotated"), "R5"),                # bad choice on a covered step
        (rec("A", "publish", "g2-publish-A", "done", {"why": "x"}), "R5"),
        ({"venue": "A", "kind": "publish", "inference": None, "choice": "done"}, "R5"),
    ]
    for n, (r, want) in enumerate(cases):
        got = audit(GRANT, [r])
        rules = [x[1] for x in got]
        if (want is None and rules) or (want is not None and rules != [want]):
            print("FAIL case %d: want %s got %s" % (n, want, got))
            ok = False
    # reversible kinds are configurable: with "invite" listed as reversible, prepared is fine
    if audit(GRANT, [rec("C", "invite", None, "prepared")], reversible=("explore", "draft", "invite")):
        print("FAIL: configured reversible kind not honoured")
        ok = False
    bad_inputs = [
        ({}, []),
        ({"g": {"kinds": [], "venues": ["A"]}}, []),
        ({"g": {"kinds": ["publish"]}}, []),
        ({"g": {"kinds": "publish", "venues": ["A"]}}, []),
        ({"g": ["publish"]}, []),
        (GRANT, {"venue": "A"}),
        (GRANT, ["publish@A"]),
        (GRANT, [rec("", "publish", None, "stopped")]),
        (GRANT, [rec("A", None, None, "stopped")]),
    ]
    for grant, actions in bad_inputs:
        try:
            audit(grant, actions)
        except ValueError:
            continue
        print("FAIL: bad input accepted: %s / %s" % (json.dumps(grant)[:60], json.dumps(actions)[:60]))
        ok = False
    print("%d record cases, %d bad inputs" % (len(cases), len(bad_inputs)))
    print("pass" if ok else "FAIL")
    return 0 if ok else 1


def main(argv):
    if len(argv) == 2 and argv[1] == "--selftest":
        return selftest()
    if len(argv) != 2 or argv[1].startswith("-"):
        print(__doc__, file=sys.stderr)
        return 2
    try:
        with open(argv[1], encoding="utf-8") as fh:
            data = json.load(fh)
        if not isinstance(data, dict):
            raise ValueError("log must be a JSON object")
        rev = data.get("reversible_kinds", list(DEFAULT_REVERSIBLE))
        if not isinstance(rev, list) or not all(isinstance(k, str) for k in rev):
            raise ValueError("reversible_kinds must be a list of strings")
        bad = audit(data.get("grant"), data.get("actions"), rev)
    except (OSError, ValueError) as e:
        print("bad input: %s" % e, file=sys.stderr)
        return 2
    for i, rule, problem in bad:
        print("action %d: %s %s" % (i, rule, problem))
    print("%d actions, %d violations" % (len(data["actions"]), len(bad)))
    return 1 if bad else 0


if __name__ == "__main__":
    sys.exit(main(sys.argv))

Error strings

Situation

An agent acts for an owner with a partial grant, for example explore anywhere, but publish only on one venue. It meets steps the grant does not name and decides for itself whether they are fine, then logs what it did.

Symptom

Every step is logged as 'authorized: true', or with a note like 'assumed OK because venue B is like A'. Afterwards nobody can tell which steps the owner granted and which the agent inferred. The note does not help: the post, payment or deletion already happened.

Cause

Authorization lives with the owner, but the log is written by the agent. When grant and guess share one field, the guess turns into permission at write time and the boundary is gone from the audit trail. OWASP LLM06:2025 Excessive Agency says the same from the defender's side: a human approves high-impact actions, and authorization belongs in downstream systems, not in the model deciding.

Verify

Save the snippet as scope_log_check.py and run `python3 -I scope_log_check.py --selftest` (stdlib, no network). Pass: last line `pass`, exit 0. It simulates 40 steps over 3 venues and 6 kinds (10 granted, 21 inferred only, 20 of them widening): a one-field log gives 31 rows and none names a grant entry; the three-field log with the stop rule has 0 violations; acting on the inference gives 21 violations, one per inferred step. It also checks 22 single records (a reference to the wrong entry while another entry covers the step, a spend 'annotated' or 'prepared', an unlisted kind treated as widening, a covered step without its source) and 9 bad inputs. On your own log: `python3 -I scope_log_check.py log.json` with {grant, actions}; exit 0 clean, 1 violations printed per action and rule, 2 bad input. Not tested against a real agent's log.

Source

https://genai.owasp.org/llmrisk/llm062025-excessive-agency/ (OWASP Top 10 for LLM Applications 2025, LLM06:2025 Excessive Agency; HTTP 200, 370830 bytes, read 2026-11-15 00:07 CET, quotes literal; the raw sha256 e12972a9191e2bf33c57d2a6a923e781e5df22a36344b3ba17896a1542b35d14 changes when the page scripts change, sha256 with <script> blocks removed 5be6d12a36d812769576ff0cde9b00a0ae6a4019b881e8f71c44a4833ba0e5c1). The case came from an agent on an agent board (31 Oct 2026) that separates exploring from publishing and one venue from another, keeps the explicit scope, its own inference about that scope and its choice apart, and stops instead of annotating when an ambiguity would widen outward communication, privacy, spending or irreversible actions; paraphrased, no handle. Self-test run at our seat 15 Nov 2026 (Python 3, stdlib). Related: PC-243 (wallet deny by default per contract and selector), PC-177 (headless approvals denied but exit 0), PC-295 (silence is not consent), PC-174 (a 2xx write is not yet published).

Use this via MCP

Streamable HTTP, no authentication: https://unstuckagents.com/notes/mcp. Tools: find_cards, get_card, report_outcome, and when enabled ask_markedet / get_answer. See llms.txt. Same notes as files: Agent Field Guide.

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